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A "REPUTATION"  REFINEMENT  WITHOUT EQUILIBRIUM 
BY JOEL WATSON1 
THE  ECONOMIC LITERATURE  concerning agents' reputations has grown steadily since the 
seminal  work of  Kreps,  Milgrom,  Roberts,  and  Wilson.2  Early work focused  on  how 
incomplete  information leads  to equilibria that are vastly different (but more intuitive) 
than those possible in the complete information game. Recently, however, game theorists 
have been  studying how incomplete  information might refine the set of equilibria.3 One 
important class of games is that in which a single long-run agent plays a simultaneous 
move  (stage)  game with  a sequence  of  opponents,  each  of whom  plays only once,  yet 
observes  all  previous  play. Fudenberg  and  Levine  (1989)  study the  reputation  of  the 
long-run player in this type of game. They argue that the "'most  reasonable' equilibrium 
is the one which the long-run player most prefers." Their intuition is sustained when one 
perturbs the game with the "Stackelberg strategy." Fudenberg and Levine show that in 
the perturbed game the equilibrium payoffs of the long-run player are bounded below by 
a number that converges to the "Stackelberg payoff." 
Fudenberg  and Levine (and the others who have developed  reputation models)  take 
the notion of Nash equilibrium as fundamental in the analysis. However, it would seem 
as though our intuition about reputations relies little on equilibrium concepts. This leads 
to  two  questions.  First,  can  meaningful  reputations  develop  apart  from  equilibria? 
Second, if so, under what circumstances can reputations develop? 
As  I will demonstrate,  equilibrium concepts  are not required in order for players to 
establish significant reputations. I study (following Fudenberg and Levine (1989)) games 
in which a long-run player faces a sequence of short-run opponents. Like Fudenberg and 
Levine,  I consider perturbations of  the  game  involving the  Stackelberg strategy. How- 
ever, whereas they focus on equilibria, I will only require that players "best-respond" to 
their beliefs.  Whenever the conjectures of the short-run players are "generally compara- 
ble" (e.g. contained in a compact set), I obtain the same refinement as do Fudenberg and 
Levine, but without an equilibrium assumption. What is important for reputations is that 
the beliefs  of the short-run agents not be  too  dispersed in a sense  to be made precise. 
Players  can  thus  establish  meaningful  reputations  from  within  the  loose  confines  of 
individual rationality. 
This paper borrows heavily from the work of Fudenberg  and Levine (1989). In fact, 
their statistical result (their Lemma 1), which establishes the potential gain of building a 
reputation, requires no notion  of equilibrium. It does  require that the short-run agents 
hold the  same belief, which is implied by equilibrium. I simply invoke their lemma in a 
more general setting (in which short-run players may hold different beliefs) and study the 
type of beliefs which allow it to refine the set of rational outcomes. 
Note  that a similar style of research has been followed on another front as well. Cho 
(1991) extends the Coase conjecture to a nonequilibrium setting. Cho's work is similar to 
mine in that we both take as fundamental a rationalizability notion. Our analyses require 
additional restrictions, however,  and it is the  nature of  these  restrictions in which our 
11 am grateful to David Kreps, Marco LiCalzi, two referees, and the editor for comments. This is 
Chapter 2 of my Ph.D.  dissertation for Stanford University Graduate School of Business. 
2 Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) resolve  Selten's (1977) chain-store 
paradox by studying the incumbent firm's potential  reputation in an incomplete  information game. 
Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982) use the same technique to support cooperation  in the 
finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. 
3Examples  of such inquiries are Aumann and Sorin (1989), Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1991), 
and Watson (1992a, b). 
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methodologies  differ. My model  includes an infinite number of short-run players and I 
must require that  their beliefs  not  be  too  dispersed  in  order for  a reputation  by the 
long-run player to be viable.  Cho (1991) studies  learning schemes  of  the  buyer in  the 
standard one-sided  offer bargaining model under one-sided  incomplete  information. He 
invokes rationalizability over the learning schemes of the buyer and the strategies of the 
seller.  Cho restricts the  buyer's forecasting  schemes  to  be  stationary and to  satisfy a 
monotonicity condition, and argues that stationarity (rather than equilibrium) drives the 
Coase conjecture. 
1.  THE  BASIC  LONG-RUN/SHORT-RUN  GAME 
Suppose a long-run player (hereafter known as player 1) faces an infinite sequence  of 
short-run players (players 2). Label each player 2 with the  period  in which this player 
faces player 1. That is, player 2n  faces player 1 in period  n. Each period the long-run 
player and this period's short-run player play the finite stage game G = (A1, A2; U1, u2}. 
Each player 2 plays only once, but observes all previous play. In the stage game, player 
l's action space is A1 (from which he selects an action each period), while each player 2's 
action space is A2. The corresponding sets of mixed actions are denoted  AA1 and AA2. 
The  stage  game  payoffs of  player  i  (i =  1,2)  are given by  ui:  A1 xA2  -4  R,  which  is 
defined over action profiles and is extended  to the space of independent,  mixed action 
profiles by means of an expected payoff calculation. 
Let BR: AA1 -4  AA2  be the best-response  correspondence  of the players 2, and by a 
slight abuse of notation, let ai EAi  denote the mixed strategy for player i that assigns all 
probability to action ai. If some "best-responding" player 2n holds conjecture a,1  E AA1 
about player l's  action in period  n, then this player will select  a strategy from BR(al). 
Player  l's  Stackelberg (stage  game)  payoff  is  the  greatest  payoff player  1  can  be 
guaranteed if he is able to commit to an action. That is, let 
u*  max  min  ul(al,a2) 
ale-A1  a2eBR(ai) 
denote the (pure strategy) Stackelberg payoff, and let  al* satisfy 
min  ul(al*, a2)  = Ui 
aE=-BR (a* 
Action  a*  is player l's  Stackelberg action. Also, let  ul  mine  ,  A  u  xA2 u1(a). 
The repeated  game described above shall be denoted  G  S, where  8 E (0, 1) is player 
l's discount factor. Let the long-run player's (stage game) payoff in period  n be given by 
u n, for all n = 1, 2,....  The payoff of the long-run player in the supergame is simply the 
normalized,  discounted  sum  of  stage  game  payoffs:  (1-  )2n=i8n-lun  .  The  payoff  of 
each  short-run player is  the  stage  game  payoff in  the  period  in which  she  faces  the 
long-run player. 
In each period, the long-run and short-run players can condition their actions on the 
entire past history of play. Let  Hn denote  the set of possible histories through period n. 
That is, Hn =-  (A1 xA2)n.  Also, let H  U n0Hn  be the set of all possible histories, and 
let  H-.=  (A1 x A2)-  be  the  set  of  infinite  histories.  Note  that  Ho  0  represents  the 
"history" at the start of the game. Given some infinite history he. E H,,  let  T(h.)  be the 
set of finite histories that agree with h..  I will focus on histories in which player 1 always 
plays the  Stackelberg  action  a*.  For  simplicity,  define  H,,* as  the  set  of  all  infinite 
histories in which player 1 always plays a*, let  H*  T(H,,*), and let  Hn*  Hn n H*. 
A  (supergame)  strategy for player  1 is  a mapping  s1: H -  A1.  A  mixed (behavior) 
strategy for player 1 is a mapping o-1:  H -4  A1.  Likewise, a strategy for player 2n is a 
mapping  sn:  Hn -4A2,  n=  1,2,...,  and  mixed  strategies  are  defined  analogously. 
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Stackelberg strategy s*,  which  takes  the  action  a*  in  each  period,  regardless  of  the 
history. That is, s*(h)  a*, for all h E H. 
Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990) show that a kind of Folk Theorem holds for the 
game just defined.  More  importantly for this paper, the  set  of  rationalizable strategies 
(Bernheim  (1984) and Pearce  (1984)) leads  to  a wide  range of outcomes  as well.  With 
common knowledge of individual rationality, there may be beliefs of the long-run player 
which  lead  to  payoffs  that  are  significantly below  the  Stackelberg  payoff,  even  as  a 
approaches unity. I will show that best-response behavior (weaker than rationalizability) 
leads  to a significant refinement in the  expected  payoffs of player 1 if one  allows for a 
slight  perturbation  of  the  game.  In  fact,  this  payoff  refinement  is  the  same  as  that 
obtained by Fudenberg and Levine! 
2.  THE  PERTURBED  GAME  AND  RESULTS 
In  the  perturbed  version  of  G.S,  player  1 may not  be  a  "rational" player.  With 
probability e player 1 is the perturbation that adopts the Stackelberg strategy s*.  Other 
perturbations are allowed but do not change the results to follow, as long as player 1 is 
rational with  some  positive  probability. So  then,  formally assume  that before  G  S  is 
played,  nature  selects  player  l's  type. With  probability e  player  1 is  the  Stackelberg 
strategy, and with probability y  player 1 is rational. (If  y + 8 < 1 then other perturba- 
tions are selected  with positive probability.) Denote  this perturbed game G  S(8, S*).4  I 
will focus on the expected payoff of the rational player 1 in this perturbed game. 
At  each  information  set  in  such  a  game  (after  all  histories),  the  players  entertain 
beliefs  about the strategies of their opponents.  Player 1 conjectures about the  strategy 
that each player 2 employs, and each player 2 holds some belief about player l's  strategy 
and the  strategies chosen  by the other players 2. I will not need  to characterize all of 
these  beliefs.  Rather,  I will  only  need  to  formulate  the  conjecture  of  each  player  2 
concerning player l's  choice of action al* (after each history). 
Formally, each player 2 holds a system of conjectures  7T  {=h}h  ,  Hs  which specifies this 
player's belief concerning the likelihood that player 1 will choose  the Stackelberg action 
after each particular history h E H. That is, given a system of conjectures 7I and a history 
h E H,  7Th  is the probability that this player assigns to player 1 selecting  a* after h. Note 
that  7I  does  not  represent  a  conjecture  about  player  l's  type.  It  merely  gives  the 
probability that this agent believes  player 1 (rational or a perturbation) will select  the 
Stackelberg action. Let H  be the set of all systems of conjectures that are consistent with 
Bayes' Law and the perturbation of the game. 
Each player 2 plays in only one  period,  and this period is the only one  in which her 
conjecture  is  vital  to  her  choice  of  action.  However,  players  2  will  learn  from  all 
preceding play (and will update their conjectures accordingly). Furthermore, I will need 
to compare the conjectures of the players 2. For these reasons, I have defined systems of 
conjectures for all of the players 2. When it is necessary to identify a particular player 2n7 
I will denote  as in  this player's system of conjectures in the game G LS(,  s*).  Otherwise 
I will drop the subscript. 
Assume that all the players know the form of the game being played. Since the game is 
perturbed, there  are constraints on  the  system of  conjectures  7I E1  H  of  each player 2. 
First, it  must be  that  7T0 >  e.  Furthermore, by Bayes'  Law,  7Th  >2  for  each  h E H*. 
Define  the pseudo-metric  d: H x H -I  R+  as follows. 
For  7T,u  E ll  d(77A)=SUp  {17Th-Ah  I  Ih EH*}. 
4An alternative interpretation of the perturbed game, which Fudenberg and Levine (1989) adopt, 
is- that "irrational" types are actually best-responding  agents, but have different payoffs than their 
"rational" counterparts. For instance, the Stackelberg type may be thought of as having payoffs such 
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This  pseudo-metric  measures  the  difference  in  the  conjectures  about  the  Stackelberg 
action  over  all histories  in which  a*  is  always played. (H, d)  is  thus  a pseudo-metric 
space.S Note,  though, that HI is not compact. 
I wish to assume a minimal amount of individual rationality. Essentially, I require that 
player 1 believe  (or know) that each player 2 holds conjectures that are consistent with 
Bayes' Law and that each player 2 best-responds  to her conjecture when called upon to 
play the stage game. I also require that all players know the form of the game, and that 
the rational player 1 selects a strategy that is a best-response  to his belief concerning the 
strategies of his opponents. Note  that these assumptions are much weaker than assuming 
that players reach  an equilibrium in the  game.  In fact,  these  assumptions  are weaker 
than  rationalizability.6 In particular, players may entertain beliefs  that are not compati- 
ble with the common knowledge of individual rationality, much less compatible with each 
other. 
In  addition  to  the  assumptions  above,  I require one  further assumption concerning 
what  the  long-run player believes  about  the  strategies  of  his  opponents.  A  few  more 
definitions will simplify matters. Given 7r  E1  H and r > 0, let BrG7 )  (iT'  c  I  d(7r,  7r') < r} 
be the ball of radius r centered  at ir.  P  shall denote  the set of positive integers. 
DEFINITION  1:  Take a function k: R+ -4 P. A set  A c H  is said to be of size k if and 
only if for each  r > 0, A can be covered by k(r)  balls of radius r. 
Note  that each compact set is of size k for some k: R+ -4 P, because compact sets are 
totally bounded (by the Bolzano-Weierstrass characterization of compact sets). Also,  any 
subset of a compact set (any conditionally compact set) conforms to this definition. 
I require player 1 to believe  that the systems of conjectures of the short-run players 
are contained  in  some  set  of  size  k,  for some  k:  R + -4 P.  This  doesn't  mandate  that 
player 1 know in what set (of size  k)  the conjectures of the  short-run players reside.  I 
only require player 1 to believe  that, whatever are the conjectures of the players 2, the 
conjectures are not too dispersed. 
The nature of "dispersed conjectures" is not intuitively portrayed by Definition  1. For 
this reason, I think a few examples are in order. First, suppose  A c H  is a finite set. All 
finite sets are compact, so this certainly satisfies Definition  1. It also demonstrates how 
arbitrary the conjectures of the players 2 can be. Each player 2 can hold any system of 
conjectures, as long as the set of all the conjectures is finite. 
However, much more can be accommodated by Definition  1. Suppose we start with a 
finite number of arbitrary  systems of conjectures, A1l,  A2'  ...  , AL  E H. Then let A c H  be 
defined as the convex hull of {,t1,  A2'  ...  LdL};  that is, vr c  A if there is some  x  from the 
L-dimensional  unit simplex such that  17 =  X  (A,1,...  ,AL).  By construction,  A can be  a 
very large (uncountably infinite) set and can include a wide variety of conjectures. In fact, 
A is easily seen to be compact and thus obeys Definition  1. 
As  a simple example, suppose we have some finite set of mixed strategies of player 1. 
Then  if  each  player 2 holds  a belief  whose  support is contained  in this finite set,  the 
corresponding set  of  systems of  conjectures  is of  size  k  for some  k:  R+ -4 P.  We  can 
allow the support to be infinite, but then we must insist that the beliefs  of the players 2 
be convex combinations of a finite number of beliefs. An example which does not satisfy 
this restriction is the following. Suppose each player 2n believes that the rational player 1 
SUsing  equivalence  classes  defined  by  d,  where  1T  and  ,u  are  equivalent  if  and  only  if 
d(rr, u) = 0, we have a metric space with metric d. See  Royden (1988) for details. 
6Rationalizability  has  not  been  formally  defined  for  perturbed  or  Bayesian  games,  nor  for 
infinitely repeated  games. However, the notion  of rationalizability (which would be present  in any 
suitable definition) is based on the iterated deletion  of those strategies which cannot be justified by 
best-response  behavior. While rationalizability incorporates an infinite number of such iterations, I 
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will  select  the  Stackelberg  action  through  period  n -  1,  but  in  period  n  will  select 
another action. Notice, then, that rr  n  -  ?  y for all m > n and all h E H,*_  1. There- 
fore d(77n,  rm)  2  y  for all n = m, which implies that the set of conjectures of the players 
2 is not compact. My main result below will not hold in such a situation. 
Let  F _{7Tn  In E P} be the set containing the systems of conjectures of every player 2. 
The assumptions above are summarized by the following definition. 
DEFINITION  2:  Take a function k: R+ -  P  and a given game G/f(e,  s*).  Players are 
said to hold  type R-k beliefs if and only if the following are satisfied: 
(1)  Player 1 believes  (knows) that 
(a)  F  is of size k, 
(b)  each player 2n plays a best-response to her conjecture when she is called upon 
to play (in period  n), and 
(c)  the system of conjectures  I7,1 of each player 2n is consistent with the form of 
the game (specifically, the perturbation); and 
(2)  Player 1 knows the form of the game and selects a best-response to his conjectures 
about the strategies of the players 2. 
Notice  that player 1 need  not know F.  Also,  it is not sufficient that player 1 believe 
that  F  is contained in some (possibly unknown) compact set. What is important is that 
player 1 believe  that F  is of size k  for some given k. For example, it is insufficient that 
player 1 believe  that  F  has finite cardinality; we need  (in this case) that player 1 know 
that  F  is of cardinality M or less, for some given M. 
Let  J1(0, ?, k)  be  the  infimum expected  payoff of  the  rational player 1 in the  game 
G  j(e,  s*)  when  players hold  type  R-k  beliefs.  This infimum exists because  the  set  of 
feasible payoffs for player 1 is bounded from below. The following result establishes the 
power  of  the  Stackelberg  perturbation  and  demonstrates  that  players  can  establish 
significant reputations independent  of equilibria. 
THEOREM:  Take any function k: R+  P and let e E (0, 1). There exists a number l(k, ?) 
such that 
Y1(,  ?  k)  >  1(k,  )u*  +  (1 -a1(k'E))U 
That is, in the limit (as  8 approaches unity) the rational player 1 is guaranteed at least his 
Stackelberg  payoff (in terms of his own expectations). 
PROOF:  Since  BR  is upper hemicontinuous  and A2  is finite, there is some  p E  (0,1) 
such  that  [a1E  AA1,  a1(a*)>p]  implies  that  BR(ad)cBR(a*).7  Therefore,  given  a 
system of  conjectures  ir  for some  player 2',  7hr > p  implies  that player 2n will play a 
best-response  to a*  if she faces player 1 after history h. 
For any set  X,  let #X  denote  the cardinality (number of elements) of  X.  Fudenberg 
and Levine (1989) prove the following result, which appears here in terms of the current 
notation. 
LEMMA:  Take any system of conjectures Tr E-  H of a player  2n  in the game G LS(8, s*), 
and take any h.  E H*.  Then 
#{Th  <z|h  E T(h,)}<  <n 
n  nz 
for every  z E=  (0, 1). 
7See  Fudenberg and Levine (1989). 204  JOEL WATSON 
This implies that, given a system of conjectures for some player 2,n there is a bound 
on the number of times this player would not  play a best-response  to a* (if called upon 
to play in all periods) if player 1 were to always play a*. 
Given the above facts, the result is not difficult to prove. Fix e E  (0, 1) and take any 
function  k:  R+ -4 P.  We  presume,  then,  that player 1 believes  F  to be  of  size  k.  Let 
All  A21 ...  I  *k((l  -p)/2)  E  be such that 
rCB(lp,)2(pl)  UB(l-p)/2(p2)  U  ... 
UB(l-p)/2(k((l-p)/2))- 
Now take one  such ,u,,  1 < t < k((1 -  p)/2).  By the  definition of the  pseudo-metric  d, 
[rh  <p  for some  ir E B(l -p)/2(L.)]  implies  that  Ah < (p + 1)/2.  The  lemma of  Fuden- 
berg and Levine (1989) establishes that, for any h.  E,  H*, 
/t  <  IhET(h.)}  <  ln 
2  hI  n(P+) 
Therefore 
#{h<  p Ih E- T(h>)T  E- B(l -p)/2  ( At)  <  p +  1 
(2) 
for each t =1,  2,..  ., k((1 -  p)/2). 
Thus, for any h.  E H*,  we have that 
#(<  P  h  T()  X  c  }  <k  (2  l  n (p  + 1) -  In  2  (  ) 
That is, if player 1 always selects  action  a*,  there are at most  l(k, ?)  periods (indepen- 
dent of  8) in which his opponent will not play a best-response to a*. The worst case for 
player 1 is when  these  periods  occur at the  beginning of  the game, where  payoffs are 
least discounted. This gives the bound of the theorem.  Q.E.D. 
3. AN EXTENSION 
The theorem is most powerful as a limiting result (when 8 converges to one). As such, 
it can be embellished slightly. Here is a more robust interpretation, which is somewhat of 
a corollary. Suppose that we consider a convergent sequence of discount factors {fil  -}  1 
which defines a sequence  of long-run/short-run  games (all with the same stage game). 
Let  7r(-) be  the  system of  conjectures  of  player 2n in the  game  indexed  by  i,  and let 
f'-{  (')  nIn  E=P}.  For any set  Ac H  let  wi(A) = 0  i  rrn()  EAl  be the dis- 
counted  "weight"  (in  terms  of  player  l's  payoffs)  of  the  players  whose  systems  of 
conjectures in game i are contained in A. 
Suppose we have a sequence  of sets (A') clH  such that  A' is of size  k,:  R+  P,  for 
each  i = 1, 2,....  Further suppose  that {ki} is such that limi  '  a8ki(z) =  1  for all  z > 0. 
This  allows  ki(z)  to  approach  infinity,  but  not  "too  quickly." Assume  that  w'(Ai) 
converges to one  as i approaches infinity. Finally, assume players hold type R-ki beliefs 
in game i. Then it is not difficult to show that there is a lower bound J1 on the expected 
payoff of the long-run player in game i, and lim  Vl =  u-  . 
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